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NOTES
and federal legislation. The enactment of minimal federal legislation regulat-
ing internal union affairs is therefore desirable. Such legislation should be
designed, not only to afford adequate relief against abuses of union power, but
also to encourage and assist unions to improve their own self-government.
8 3
)X
REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION OF CHURCHES
Introduction
The power to tax is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.' In
the United States it is vested exclusively in the legislative branch of
government unless limited by constitutional provision.2  Incidental
to this power is the power to exempt, and, in the absence of constitu-
tional prohibition, its exercise is essentially a question of a choice of
policy. In response to the will of the people, this legislative discretion
has traditionally been resolved in favor of exempting the real property
of religious institutions from taxation.
At the present time thirty-three state constitutions contain pro-
visions pertaining to this type of exemption. In eighteen constitutions
these provisions are mandatory; 3 in fourteen they are permissive; 
4
and the remaining one contains a combination of both features.
Jurisdictions which lack specific constitutional authorization grant
like exemption by general legislation.6 It has long been settled that
83 Id. at 674.
' See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 366 (1939) ; Transportation Co.
v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 281 (1878); The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall.
206, 226 (U.S. 1873) ; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (U.S. 1819).
2 See People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 426 (1851);
see also Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880).
3 AL. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 91; ARK. CoNsT. Art. 16, § 5; CAL. CONST. Art.
XIII, § 1Y2; FLA. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 16; KAN. CoNsT. Art. 11, § 1; Ky.
CoNsr. § 170; LA. CONsT. Art X, § 4; MINN. CONsT. Art. 9, § 1; N.J. CoNsT.
Art. 8, § 1, j 2; N.M. CoNsT. Art. 8, § 3; N.Y. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 1; N.D.
CoNsT. Art. XI, § 176; OKLA. CONST. Art. X, §6; S.C. CoNsr. Art. 10, §4;
S.D. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 6; UTAH CONST. Art. XIII, § 2; VA. CoNsT. Art.
XIII, § 183; Wyo. CoNsT. Art. 15, § 12.
4A~iz. CONsT. Art. 9, § 2; GA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 2-5404; IL.. CoNsr.
Art. IX, § 3; InD. CoNsr. Art. 10, § 1; Mo. CONST. Art. X, § 6; MONT. CONsT.
Art. XII, § 2; Nan. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 2; NEv. CONST. Art. VIII, § 132;
N.C. CON sT. Art. 5, § 5; OHIO CoNsT. Art XII, § 2; PA. CoNsT. Art. 9, § 1;
TENN. CONsT. Art. 2, § 28; TEx. CONsT. Art. VIII, § 2; W. VA. CoNsT.
Art. X, § 1.
5 CoLo. CoNsr. Art. 10, § 5.
6 CONN. GmN. STAT. §§ 1761(11), 1763 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9,§ 8103 (1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp. 1953) ; IowA CODE c. 427,§427.1(9) (1949); ME. REV. STAT. c. 81, §6(V) (1944), as amended, Laws
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such legislation is not in conflict with state constitutional provisions
which prohibit the levying of taxes to aid any religious group or sect.7
Exemption provisions, however, do not include special, local assess-
ments," unless expressly provided,9 or taxes due on the real property
prior to its acquisition by a religious institution.'0
Although such exemption is universal 11 in this country, it is far
from uniform, and in determining the extent of property exempt in
particular jurisdictions the constitutions or statutory language 12 and
judicial decisions '1 of the various jurisdictions must be examined.
Some jurisdictions limit the exemption to land used "exclusively" for
religious purposes 14 or to land "actually" used or occupied.' 5  Other
of Me. 1951, c. 62; M% CODE ANN. art. 81, § 8(4) (Flack, 1951) ; MASS. LAWS
ANN. c. 59, §5(11) (Supp. 1953); MIcH. ComP. LAWS §211.7(5) (Mason,
Supp. 1952); Miss. CODE ANN. §9697(d) (Supp. 1952); N.H. REv. LAWS
c. 73, §§ 24-26, 28 (1942) ; ORE. REv. STAT. c. 307, § 307.140 (1953); RI. GEN.
LAWS c. 29, § 2 (1938), as amended by Laws of R.I. 1947, c. 1855, § 1; VT.
STAT. §§ 649(IV), 652 (1947); WASH. REV. CODE tit. 84, §84.36.020 (1952);
Wis. STAT. §70.11(4) (1953).
7 See Trustees of Griswold College v. Iowa, 46 Iowa 275 (1877). "The
argument is, that exemption from taxation of church property is the same thing
as compelling contribution to churches to the extent of the exemption. We
think the constitutional prohibition extends only to the levying of tithes, taxes,
or other rates for church purposes, and that it does not include the exemption
from taxation of such church property as the legislature may think proper."
Id. at 282.
8 City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 13 S.E. 252
(1891) ; City of Ottawa v. Trustees of The Free Church, 20 Ill. 423 (1858) ;
Lefevre v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich. 587 (1853). "No answer to this question
is afforded by citing the clause of the constitution which authorizes the general
assembly to exempt church property as well as public property from taxation.
. . . This court has ruled . . . that the taxation to which that power relates
is taxation for revenue, and not local assessments for the improvement of
streets, which latter are in the nature of an interchange of equivalents between
the public and the owners of property locally benefited ... " City of Atlanta
v. First Presbyterian Church, supra, 13 S.E. at 254.
9 State, Protestant Foster Home Society, Pros. v. Mayor of Newark, 36
N.J.L. (7 Vroom) 478 (1873).
10 Accord, People ex rel. Thompson v. Saint Francis Xavier Female
Academy, 233 Ill. 26, 84 N.E. 55 (1908).
i Exemption is also granted in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE tit. 47,
§ 47-801a(n) (1951).
12 See notes 14-18 infra.
'3 Compare Immanuel Presbyterian Church v. Payne, 90 Cal. App. 176, 265
Pac. 547 (1928), with Enochs v. City of Jackson, 144 Miss. 360, 109 So. 864
(1926).
14 Constitutional provisions: ALA. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 91; CAL CoNsT. Art.
XIII, § 1A; GA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 2-5404; ILL. CONsT. Art. IX, § 3; KAN.
CONST. Art. XI, § 1; Mo. CoNsT. Art. X, § 6; MONT. CONsT. Art. XII, § 2;
N.D. CONST. Art. XI, § 176; OHIo CONsT. Art. XII, § 2; OKLA. CONST. Art. X,
§ 6; S.D. CONST. Art. XI, § 6; Wyo. CoNST. Art. XV, § 12.
Legislative provisions: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1761(11), 1763 (1949); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 81, § 8(4) (Flack, 1951); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 137.100 (Vernon,
1952); W. VA. CODE § 678 (1949).
15 Ky. CONST. § 170; S.C. CoNST. Art. X, § 4. Pennsylvania and Texas
exempt "actual places of religious worship." PA. CONsT. Art. IX, § 1; Tax.
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jurisdictions limit it to land held or owned by religious societies and
used exclusively for religious purposes.16 In addition to these re-
strictions, some jurisdictions limit the amount or value of property
exempt,' 7 but most jurisdictions expressly exempt rectories and
parsonages.18 This lack of uniformity also exists in determining when
the exemption begins.19 While it is the policy of the law to favor a
strict construction of statutes exempting property from taxation,20
these statutes are liberally construed in most jurisdictions.2'
CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 2. See also MONT. REv. CODE § 84-202 (1947) ("places of
actual religious worship"). Massachusetts does not extend the exemption to
"houses of religious Worship appropriated to other uses." MASS. CODE ANN.
c. 59, § 5(11) (Supp. 1953).
16 Constitutional provisions: FLA. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 16; NEB. CONST.
Art. VIII, § 2; N.J. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 1, 112; N.Y. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 1;
TENN. CONST. Art. II, § 28; VA. CONST. Art. XIII, § 183.
Legislative provisions: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp. 1953) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. §9697(d) (1952); NER. REv. STAT. §77-202(3) (1950); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-296(3) (1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1085(2) (Williams,
1943); Wis. STAT. §70.11(4) (1953).
7 ALA. CONsT. Art. IV, § 91 (up to one acre in, or within one mile of, an
incorporated city or town; elsewhere, up to five acres) ; ILL. STAT. ANN. § 32.264
(Jones Cum. Supp. 1949) (up to ten acres); IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-201(6)(Burns, 1951) (not exceeding fifteen acres) ; KY. CONST. § 170 (not exceeding
one-half acre in cities and towns; not exceeding two acres elsewhere); N.H.
REv. LA w c. 73, §§ 25, 26 (1942) (limited to $150,000, but towns may increase
exemption); WASH. REv. CODE § 84.36.020 (1952) (not exceeding five acres;
church seats must be free to all).
18 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp. 1953) ; IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-201(6) (Burns, 1951); Ky. CONST. § 170; ME. REv. STAT. c. 81, § 6(V)
(1944), as amended, Laws of Me. 1951, c. 62; MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, § 8(4)
(Flack, 1951); MAss. CODE ANN. c. 59, § 5(11) (Supp. 1953); MICH. ComP.
LAws § 211.7(5) (Mason, Supp. 1952); N.H. REv. LAws c. 73, § 24 (1942) ;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(3) (1950); S.C. CoNsT. Art. X, § 4; TEX. CoNsT.
Art. VIII, § 2; VT. STAT. § 649(IV) (1947) ; VA. CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 183(b) ;
WASH. REv. CODE § 84.36.020 (1952); W. VA. CODE § 678 (1949); Wis. STAT.§70.11(4) (1951); Wyo. CONST. Art. XV, §12. See also Allred, Tax-
Exemption For Rectories, 13 JURsT 209 (1953).
19 See TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERIcA 178
(1948).
20 See People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N.Y. 245, 126 N.E. 703
(1920); 84 C.J.S. § 227.
21 See Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 288 (1950). The rule requiring strict con-
struction of exemption statutes should not be slavishly followed when the prop-
erty is used for a purpose encouraged by the exemption and the application of
this rule would frustrate that purpose. See New York Catholic Protectory
v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 427, 428, 23 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (Sup. Ct.
1940). See also Matter of Major Deegan Blvd., 131 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
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Notwithstanding the universal and traditional extent of this prac-
tice, it has not received uncritical acceptance. Some reports have
been directed at its constitutionality, while others are concerned with
its wisdom and advisability. In order to remove any misunderstand-
ing which might result from these reports, the legal, ethical, social
and economic justification for this practice will be explored.
Legal Justification
As pointed out above, the constitutions of most states explicitly
authorize tax exemptions for the real property of religious institu-
tions, 22 and exemptions by state legislation have been held not vio-
lative of state constitutional provisions prohibiting the levying of taxes
to aid religious groups.28  Similarly, such exemptions do not violate
any provisions of the Federal Constitution.
The only objection that could be made to such exemption under
the United States Constitution was that they contravened the "estab-
lishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 24 as applied to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment under the absorption
theory.25  It was not until the decisions in Everson v. Board of
Education26 and Illinois ex rel. McCollumn v. Board of Education27
22 See notes 3, 4 and 5 supra.
23 See note 7 supra.
24 U.S. CoNsT. AMENDI. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. .. ."
25 Originally, this clause was not applicable to the several states. Permoli
v. First Municipality, 3 How. 589 (U.S. 1844); cf. Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833). For an exposition of the theory by which cer-
tain clauses or amendments of the Bill of Rights are applied against the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-328 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 62-68 (1947) (concurring opinion).
26330 U.S. 1 (1947). Before this decision, there was sporadic criticism
that statutes exempting church property from taxes were at variance with the
fundamental laws or principles of our government which required separation
of church and state. See Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation,
18 TAXES 361, 364 (1940) ; Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxa-
tion in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 422 (1934); Baker, Tax
Exemption Statutes, 7 TEXAs L. Rzv. 50, 84 (1928). But they do not denounce
it as being unconstitutional, and seem to confuse disestablishment with freedom
of religion. See, e.g., Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation,
supra at 364 n.12: "While separation of church and state is based chiefly upon
the principle that each member of society should be free to do as he pleases
regarding religion, and hence that he should not be forced to contribute to the
support of churches, administrative and financial considerations are also present."
27 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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that any doubt as to the constitutionality of exemptions was advanced
by some writers.2 However, the familiar declaration in the McCollum
case to the effect that the "establishment" clause is ". . . a wall be-
tween Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable" 
29
was unnecessary for the decision and was directed towards a specific
question, namely, the validity of released time programs. The insta-
bility of so extreme a position is evident from its repudiation less than
four years later in Zorach v. Clauson.30 In that case, the Court stated:
"The First Amendment . . . does not say that in every and all re-
spects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it
studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concert or union or dependence one on the other." 31 The
Court here lauded state cooperation with religious institutions as a
recognition of the religious nature of our people and as in the best
American tradition. 2  In rejecting the principle of total separation
as a constitutional mandate, the Court refused to espouse a construc-
tion that would deny all cooperation between Church and State and
result in favoring irreligion over religion.33  Moreover, illustrating
that the First Amendment does not require complete separation, the
Court pointed out that if such were the rule, any taxation of religious
institutions would be a violation of the constitutional requirement. 34
Social and Ethical Justification
Tax exemptions for church property have been known from
earliest times.35 In colonial America, such exemptions were justified
on the theory that established churches were governmental agencies
and to tax them would be self-taxation. 30  It has been suggested that
since the doctrine of disestablishment now prevails, the reason for the
exemption no longer holds and that tax exemption of church property,
no matter how noble the motives prompting it, should be abolished.
3 7
2 See Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Leg-
islation, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 147 (1949); Notes, 49 CoL. L. REV.
968, 986 (1949), 3 RUTGERS L. REv. 115, 122 (1949). See also Notes, 33 COR-
NELL L.Q. 122, 128 (1947), 8 LA. L. Rxv. 136, 140 (1947). But see Editorial,
Churches Should Pay Taxes!, 64 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 454 (1947), expressly
describing such exemption unconstitutional as a violation of the First
Amendment.
29 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra note 27 at 212.
30343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
31 Id. at 312.
32 Id. at 313-315.
38 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 238-
256 (1948) (dissenting opinion) ; see PARSONS, THE FIRST FREEDOM 79 (1948).
34 See Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 30 at 312.
35 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 183 (1953).
3; Id. at 183-184; see TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINNS OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN
AmERICA 171 (1948).3 7 See ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 344 (1933); Stimson, The
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Nevertheless, there remain compelling reasons for continuing these
exemptions.
George Washington's Farewell Address urged the necessity of
morality and integrity of individuals if the United States was to
prosper. Religion, by its very nature, inculcates these standards in
individuals, and thus strengthens the moral fiber of the community.38
Since in a state without a religious people social and moral chaos will
inevitably result, it is to the advantage of the state to aid religion
through tax exemptions.3 9 In accord with such reasoning, President
Eliot, formerly of Harvard University, deplored taxation of property
used for religious purposes, characterizing it as taxation of the highest
good of the state for lesser state functions.40
Thus, a tax exemption for meeting places of public worship is
a reward for socially desirable actions.41  Inestimable benefits are
conferred on society ". . . [by] men . . . subduing their irregular
appetites and propensities . " 42 as a result of religious discipline.
One court remarked that the moral discipline of religion is as much
value to society in preserving property as the most competent police
system.4 3  Hence, taxpayers in general are directly benefited by these
exemptions since the irenic influence of religion instills in church
members morality and respect for the property rights of others.44
The state, then, benefits from religion, and thus is warranted in
exempting property used for such purposes from taxation. But the
state also has an affirmative moral duty, from its very nature, to
foster religious sentiment among its citizens. The constitutional con-
cept of separation of Church and State guarantees to each autonomy
Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REv.
411, 416 (1934). Of course, it is clear that religious societies conducting edu-
cational or charitable institutions merit exemptions since they are performing
a governmental function.
38 See BROWN, SOME REASONS FOR THE EXEMPTION OF CHURCH PROPERTY
FROM TAXATION 13 (1881).
39 See TOBIN, THE EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED REAL
PROPERTY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES IN
NEW YORK STATE 21 (1934). "However, the most essential attribute of any
religious doctrine or creed, and the one that consequently recommends the
church for every possible measure of public support, is its powerful moral in-
fluence. While this factor is not susceptible to any pecuniary evaluation yet
its contribution to the material welfare of the community is of tremendous
importance. The churches and synagogues give forth an inspiration for good
citizenship without which this country can not survive. A community, a state
or a nation, without such institutions would not be a fit place to live."
40 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 186 (1953).
41 Cf. People ex rel. The Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, 42
Hun 27, 30 (N.Y. 1886), aff'd iene., 106 N.Y. 669, 13 N.E. 936 (1887) ; Barnes
v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401, 409 (1810).
42 See Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, supra note 41.
43 See Commonwealth v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 116 Ky. 711, 76 S.W.
522, 523 (1903).
44 See Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, supra note 41.
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in its own legitimate sphere.45 However, the doctrine of disestablish-
ment should not be interpreted to prohibit cooperation between Church
and State .4  Indeed, one reason for granting tax exemptions to
churches was to reinforce the freedom of religion provision contained
in the First Amendment.47 Furthermore, it is the function of the
state, supreme in the temporal sphere, to promote the common good
of its citizens.48  To aid its individual members in attaining their
supernatural end-the purpose for which they were created-is to
promote the common welfare.49 This is especially true where, as in
this country, the government itself is predicated upon a belief in
God. ° Consequently, the state is obliged to refrain from interfering
with religion, and it is likewise obligated to take affirmative measures
to promote religion and morality.
Pope Leo XlII's encyclical letter Immortale Dei sums up the
proposition in the following manner:
All who rule, therefore, should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one
of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under
the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any
measures that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden duty of rulers
to the people over whom they rule. For one and all we are destined by our
birth and adoption to enjoy, when this frail and fleeting life is ended, a supreme
and final good in heaven, and to the attainment of this every endeavor should
be directed. Since, then, upon this depends the full and perfect happiness of
mankind, the securing of this end should be of all imaginable interests the
most urgent. Hence civil society, established for the common welfare, should
not only safeguard the well-being of the community, but also have at heart the
interests of its individual members, in such a mode as not in any way to hinder,
but in every manner to render as easy as possible the possession of that highest
and unchangeable good for which all should seek. Therefore, for this purpose,
45 See MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 153 (1951); PARSONS, THE FIRST
FREEDOM 90 (1948).
46 See Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 24, 65
(1952). PARSONS, op. cit. supra note 45, at 107 n.12, quotes Dean Weigle of
the Yale Divinity School: "The separation of church and state . . .means
that church and state are mutually free, and that neither may rightfully control
the other. It does not mean that church and state, being mutually free, may
not co-operate with each other."
47 ADAMS, STATEMENT BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMIlTTEE OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO INVESTIGATE TAx-ExEmt1r FOUNDATIONS 5 (American
Council on Education, 1954).
48 See MARITAIN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 178.
49. ... [Ilt was the Creator's will that civil authority should regulate social
life after the dictates of an order changeless in its universal principles; should
facilitate the attainment in the temporal order, by individuals, of physical, in-
tellectual and moral perfection; and should aid them to reach their super-
natural end." PoPE PIUs XII, SUMMI PONTIFICATUS 24 (N.C.W.C., 1939).
See Harpster, supra note 46, at 63.
50 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952); ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURcH LAw §27 (1933).
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care must especially be taken to preserve unharmed and unimpeded the religion,
whereof the practice is the link connecting man with God.51
By exempting property used for religious purposes from taxa-
tion, the state is contributing to the advancement of the common wel-
fare, and discharging its moral duty toward its members to facilitate
the attainment of their ultimate end.
Economic Justification
In addition to the confusion concerning the constitutionality of,
and justification for, exempting church property from taxation, there
exist unfounded beliefs that a large amount of revenue is lost to the
states through its continuance, 52 and that an intolerable amount of tax
is shifted to other taxpayers. 58 These beliefs usually stem from un-
supported statements 54 and unreliable forecasts of people in respon-
sible positions. Significant in the latter category is an excerpt from
President Grant's message to Congress in 1875:
... I would also call your attention to the importance of correcting an evil
that, if permitted to continue, will probably lead to great trouble in our land
before the close of the nineteenth century. It is the accumulation of vast
amounts of untaxed church-property.
. . So vast a sum, receiving all the protection and benefits of government,
without bearing its proportion of the burdens and expenses of the same, will
not be looked upon acquiescently by those who have to pay the taxes .... The
contemplation of so vast a property as here alluded to, without taxation, may
lead to sequestration without constitutional authority and through blood.
I would suggest the taxation of all property equally, whether church or cor-
poration, exempting only the last resting-place of the dead. . . .55
Equally misleading are statistical reports which show the increase
of all exempt property in terms of dollar value or percentage of in-
crease.5 6 Investigation reveals that the amount of church-held prop-
erty in proportion to other exempt property is very small. 57 In New
51 PoE LEo XIII, Immortale Dei in ENCYCLICALS OF LEO XIII 111 (Wynne,
2d ed. 1903).
52 "Against any social benefits . . . must be set the cost of the exemption
subsidy. The exemption of church property . . . is a significant problem at
the present time." Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18
TAXES 361, 363 (1940).
53 "The accumulation of such property has now become so great and is
increasing so rapidly that its removal from the tax rolls adds an unjust and
increasingly felt burden upon every taxpayer." Editorial, Churches Should
Pay Taxes!, 64 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 454 (1947).
54 Ibid.
55 See 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL.: 1875 at V (Dep't State 1875).
56 See, e.g., CURRENT TAx PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK STATE 43 (1931).
57 See Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Leg-
islation, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 155 (1949).
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York the amount of exempt religious property represented only 7.194
per cent of the value of all exempt property in the State for the year
1948.58 Furthermore, analysis of relevant economic data indicates
that the proportion of property so held is constantly decreasing. In
1919 it represented 13.7 per cent of the value of all the exempt prop-
erty in New York. 9  In 1928 it was 10.5 per cent.60  In 1936 this
figure dropped to 8.6 per cent 61 and, as previously stated, it was
7.194 per cent in 1948.
Inasmuch as the State of New York has not imposed a levy on
real property since 1927, exemptions for religious property have no
direct effect on state revenues. But since real property taxes consti-
tute a major part of local government assessments, religious exemp-
tions do have an impact on these revenues. Nevertheless, the statistics
show a corresponding decrease in the proportion of religious exemp-
tions to all exemptions on the local government level as exemplified
by the City of New York. Whereas in 1931 religious exemptions
constituted 8.37 per cent of all exemptions in the five counties em-
bracing the City of New York,62 in 1948 that figure had dropped to
5.76 per cent.6 Similarly, consistent with the state trend, the aggre-
gate value of real property exempt for religious purposes dropped
from 374 millions of dollars in 1931 to 322 millions in 1948.64
Since the decrease in percentage of religious exemption is due in
part to the increase in the amount of tax exempt federal, state and
municipal property such as low rent housing projects, 65 and since
most church property is fully developed while other exempt property
is undergoing further development thereby increasing its assessed
valuation, it is most unlikely that this trend will cease. In this regard,
it is interesting to note that while religious exempt property has de-
creased consistently both percentage-wise and in actual value, the
proportion of all exempt property to all real property has increased
from 17.31 per cent in 1931 68 to 22.48 per cent in 1948 67 for New
58 See 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 87, REPORT, N.Y. STATE TAx COMMISSION 83
(1949).
5o See CURRENT TAX PROBLEMS IN NEw YORK STATE 43 (1931).
60 Ibid.
61 See N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTrE, PROBLEMS
RELATING TO TAXATION AND FINANCE 211 (1938).
62 See 1931 LEG. Doc. No. 11, REPORT, N.Y. STATE TAX Co misSIoN (1931)
passin.
63 See 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 87, REPORT, N.Y. STATE TAX COMMISSION (1949)
passim.
64 See notes 62 and 63 supra. Throughout the state, the aggregate value
of religious exempt property dropped from 607 millions of dollars in 1931 to
574 millions in 1948. Ibid.
65 Whereas in 1931 property exempt for federal and state housing aggre-
gated only $4,053,950, in 1948 that figure had risen to $154,844,153, more than
35 times the 1931 value.66 See note 62 supra.
67 See note 63 mepra.
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York State and from 18.54 per cent 68 to 24.12 per cent 69 for the
same period in New York City.
Another facet of the problem is the fact that real property is
rapidly losing its importance as a source of revenue both on the state
and local levels as new sources are tapped.70 Whereas in 1931 real
property levies collected throughout the State of New York consti-
tuted 73.4 per cent of all taxes,7' in 1948 that figure had dropped to
50.49 per cent.72  As early as 1917, the State of New York had begun
to share its revenues with the various local governmental units of the
State.73  In 1946, the somewhat confused situation was rectified by a
codification of all tax-sharing legislation into a newly enacted Article
4-A of the New York Finance Law. 74 Under the sections of this arti-
cle adopted ".. . for the support of local government and the reduction
of local real estate taxes ... ,, 75 the State binds itself to contribute a
fixed sum to each city, town and village of the State on a per capita
basis, providing that the constitutional limitations 76 on real property
taxes are not exceeded by the various units. Since 1933 the City of
New York has been authorized to enact a variety of excise taxes.7
In addition, since 1937 71 and 1950 79 respectively, other cities and
villages have been authorized to impose taxes on utilities operating
within these political subdivisions, and in 1947,s0 the Legislature au-
thorized counties and cities other than New York to impose a variety
of non-property taxes.
In view of these increasing inroads into the real property tax as
a source of revenue and in view of the decreasing proportion of re-
68 See note 62 supra.
69 See note 63 supra.
70 See HELLE STmN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 4-8 (1952). The real
property tax continues to be the mainstay of local revenue, but even there it
is losing its significance. Id. at 9-10. Statistics indicate that the percentage
of real property exempt because of its religious use is relatively constant on
the local level. See Paulsen, Preferment of Religios Institutians in Tax and
Labor Legislation, 14 LAW & CoNTEmP. PROB. 144, 155 (1949).
71 See note 62 supra.
72 See note 63 supra.
73 See Kassell, Introduction to the Tax Law of New York, 59 McKiNNEY'S
CoNsoL. LAws OF N.Y. ANN. XIX (1954).
74 Laws of N.Y. 1946, c. 301.
5 N.Y. FINANCE LAW § 54.
76 N.Y. CONST. Art. VIII, § 10.
77 E.g., Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 815; Laws of N.Y. 1934, c. 302; Laws
of N.Y. 1934, c. 873 (general city excise taxes) ; Laws of N.Y. 1941, c. 199
adding N.Y. GEN. CxTY LAW § 24-a (general business tax); Laws of N.Y.
1952, c. 235 (cigarette tax); Laws of N.Y. 1953, c. 202 adding N.Y. GEaN.
CITY LAw § 25-a et seq. (joint payroll tax). For detailed list of New York
City taxes, see 4 CCH STATE TAx REPoRTER-NEv Yoax, 100-106 et seq.
(Rep. #199, 1954).
78 Laws of N.Y. 1937, c. 321 enacting N.Y. GEN. CIT LAW § 20-b.
79 Laws of N.Y. 1950, c. 591 enacting N.Y. VILAGE LAW § 138-d.
80 Laws of N.Y. 1947, c. 278.
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ligious exempt property as indicated above, it is clear that no sub-
stantial revenue is lost by continuing the practice of religious tax
exemption.
Conclusion
This discussion clearly demonstrates that tax exemption of real
property of religious institutions is legally, ethically, socially, and
economically justified. Nevertheless, this justification is, at times,
beclouded by unfounded criticism and misleading reports. In view
of these facts, it would seem reasonable for all states to make such
exemption mandatory by constitutional provision, and thereby prevent
hasty, ill-considered repression of this socially desirable practice by
general legislation, particularly when it would not result in a signifi-
cant increase in the base taxable property.
